Shareholders actively pressure firms to eliminate perquisites that substantially destroy firm value. However, despite the anecdotal and academic evidence characterizing corporate jets as symbols of corporate excess, we continue to see a large number of firms relying on these modes of transportation. Instead of treating all jet flights as homogenous, we distinguish flights taken for various reasons and empirically examine the circumstances under which corporate jets are driven by operational versus agency factors. Using detailed flight-level data, we find some evidence consistent with the agency characterization of jets: firms with weaker corporate governance structures are more likely to fly to resort locations. However firms with more complex information, high internal information asymmetry, and greater managerial time constraints are more likely to deploy corporate jets for internal purposes, i.e., fly to company subsidiaries and plants. Moreover, consistent with corporate jets decreasing the costs of learning about and monitoring distant portions of the business, these flights to distant company locations positively affect firm value.