This paper examines the role of reported performance and earnings management, in the context of shareholder activism. I find that reporting better accounting performance at the onset of an activism campaign is associated with a lower likelihood of proxy fights and board turnover for target firms. Consequently, managers facing a threat to their control and careers take strategic actions to boost short-term earnings. Proxies for earnings management, including abnormal accruals, are significantly higher for target firms in the quarter following the launch of an activism campaign, concurrent with a short-lived improvement in profitability. Consistent with the economic incentives arising for managers, earnings management is more pronounced when the market signals support for the activist, when the activist has higher ownership, when the target firm's past performance has been poorer, and when private benefits of control for managers are higher. Furthermore, earnings management in the quarter following activism is observed only in firms which are still engaged with the activist. Finally, I find evidence suggesting that this type of earnings management influences the outcome of activism.